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 Safety-critical systems are well documented and standardized (e.g. IEC 61508, RTCA DO-
178B) within system design cycles. However in Defence and Security, systems that are 
critical to the success of a Mission are not defined within the literature nor are there any 
guidelines in defining criticality in their design or operational capabilities. When it comes 
to Vetronics (Vehicle Electronics), a mission-critical system, is a system with much 
complexity and mixed criticality levels that is a part of the overall platform (military 
vehicle) offering integrated system capabilities. In this paper, a framework is presented, 
providing guidelines in designing efficiently and effectively mission-critical systems 
considering principles of Interoperable Open Architectures (IOA), mission-critical 
integrity levels and following new standardization activities such as NATO Generic Vehicle 
Architecture (NGVA). A Defensive Aid Suite (DAS) system is used as a case study to 
illustrate how this framework can be exploited. The indention of this extension is to provide 
an approach to precisely estimate threats in order to de-risk missions in the very early 
stages. 
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1. Introduction  
Modern military vehicles rely on mission-critical systems that 
enhance and guarantee successful mission capabilities. Currently, 
these mission-critical systems come as black boxes that are 
installed and maintained by the same manufacturer through the 
vehicle’s life-cycle. These black boxes are built on proprietary 
technology that only the manufacturer has access to, thus limiting 
the choices of maintenance and upgrades. Furthermore, existing 
mission-critical systems are limited to communicating with other 
on-board systems resulting to a vehicle having multiple instances 
of the same equipment (e.g. GPS sensor). This presents a number 
of issues including having network complexity and reduced 
flexibility in vehicle systems configuration depending on 
operational requirements. 
For this reason, there is a need for an innovative architecture 
approach that allows components from different manufacturers to 
be integrated, paying particular attention to the system’s mission, 
safety, and security. When building a mission-critical system, the 
system designer should have the freedom to choose components 
that fit appropriately to the intended use as well as enable 
integration to any legacy mission-critical system or 
sensors/actuators that exist on-board the vehicle.  
In this study, a thorough investigation is conducted offering a 
new open modular architectural approach on mission-critical 
systems including a case study on Defensive Aid Suites (DAS), 
aided to extract the necessary technical and functional 
requirements directly related to the system. This presented an 
opportunity to research a conceptual approach to the bespoke 
system whereby a constructive framework could be established 
with firm recommendations on a high level (abstracted) design so 
that a target platform can be equipped with a tailored mission-
critical system to meet its specific requirements.  
The novel mission-critical system architecture for military 
platforms adopts an open and modular design approach offering 
flexibility in configuration, upgradability, and integration. This 
enables a better operational and functional understanding of the 
mission-critical system, increasing integrated survivability 
capabilities [1].  
Following the presented framework of this work, qualitative 
and quantitative results are extracted in order to provide mission 
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functional concepts based on mission-critical systems and threats. 
Additionally from the results, an early de-risking estimation can be 
observed, that could be beneficial for stakeholders, systems 
engineers and architects to decide the appropriate elements for 
designing mission-critical systems in the very early stages of the 
overall system’s life-cycle. The rest of the paper is structured as 
shown below: 
• Section 2 presents some representative key questions that 
offer the direction of designing mission-critical systems. 
• Sections 3 and 4 provides a definition for mission-critical 
systems in line with standardisation activities around military 
vehicle architecture design approach. 
• Section 5 offers the Generic Architecture Framework. 
• Section 6 identifies some key considerations on safety and 
security in aligning and defining mission criticality levels. 
• Section 7 provides an approach of calculating threats using 
numerical values and mathematical equations. 
• Sections 8, 9, 10 and 11 present a case study on how the 
framework can be used to define a DAS Architecture 
including qualitative and quantitative results. 
• Section 12 concludes the paper with some indication of next 
steps to this research. 
This paper is an extension of work originally presented in 
International Conference on Military Technologies (ICMT) 2017 
[2]. 
2. Key Questions 
2.1. Modularity and Openness   
What approaches are needed for a mission-critical system to be 
feasible and extract advantages such as modularity and openness? 
2.2. Construction, Maintenance and Safety Certification 
What are the benefits of using modules sharing specific 
functionalities on a mission-critical system and how efficient and 
effective can become? 
2.3. Alongside benefits from the framework 
How the framework’s modularity extracts through the mission-
critical system development benefits such as safety cases and 
certifications?  
2.4. Low-cost tools 
What are the necessary tools needed to accomplish a rapid 
prototyping testing and permitting software functionality and 
operation of a mission-critical system using low-cost components? 
2.5. Migration of low cost to a safety-critical performance 
verification testbed 
How to achieve a transition from a low-cost functional testbed 
to a more elaborated safety-critical performance verification 
testbed? 
3. Mission-Critical Systems 
In general, the mission is the formal summary of the aims and 
values of an activity. The activity can be achieved with specific 
mission-critical elements. Those mission-critical elements are 
defined as vital to the functioning of an activity. Meaning that, a 
successful mission can be achieved when only the right mission-
critical elements are applied. There are two attributes that make the 
specific mission-critical elements to be applied and to be right.  
First, is usually when there is maturity in the applied mission-
critical elements. The maturity must reach into a level that is 
satisfactory in each of the involved disciplines. When this level is 
reached, the expected outcome is sufficient and hence, the mission 
can be considered successful. 
The second attribute is when enough knowledge is 
accumulated to allow for the prediction of a mission outcome to be 
more accurate. To achieve this, consideration needs to be given to 
all possible factors involved on the specific mission. Those factors 
are usually known or unknown and could be anything related to 
the mission. The knowledge can be gained when those factors are 
asked and answered using three main engineering questions; 
“What”, “Why” and “How”. Once these answers are mature 
enough and understandable the mission-critical elements can be 
referred to as vital and therefore, provide success to the mission.  
Today, the technology has been developed in such a way that 
many missions could be successfully completed with the aid of 
systems. Those systems are referred to as mission-critical systems. 
A general definition of a mission-critical system is [3]:  
“A system that is essential to the survival of a service, and 
whose failure or interruption significantly impacts the mission”.  
A mission-critical system for a typical land military vehicle is: 
“A system that is essential to complete the mission 
successfully”. 
A mission-critical system in land military platform is 
composed of many discrete Vetronics (vehicle electronics) sub-
systems and components including sensors, actuators, effectors, 
radars and processing resources. Each of these sub-systems may 
contain further sub-systems and components including mechanical 
parts.   
In Vetronics the mission can be designed, described and/or 
accomplished either in simple or complex terms. This 
differentiation resulted from the characteristics that a Vetronics 
system has. A simple mission for a Vetronics system is when not 
many factors are involved. It is also simple, when a clear and an 
easy step-by-step procedure is provided. For instance, a mission-
critical system has to transmit data from node A to node B. That 
can be described as a simple mission since there is only one task 
to be completed and if the right mission-critical elements are used.  
However, in Vetronics, for a data to be transmitted from one 
node to another in reality it is more complicated than the previous 
example. What makes the mission more complicated in Vetronics 
mission-critical systems is when a number of multiple disciplines, 
such as safety, security and survivability, are involved to achieve 
the mission. A more desirable, refined and detailed mission 
procedure is required.  
Assume each of the aforementioned disciplines require to 
complete a specific goal on the same mission. The safety prioritises 
the safety of people and environment; the security prioritises the 
protection of data from various threats; and survivability prioritise 
the whole mission envelop. This makes the mission more difficult 
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to accomplish if there is neither enough maturity nor confidence 
on the applied mission-critical elements. 
In conclusion, “mission in military applications cannot be 
specified or narrowed down into a single element that easily”. 
Therefore, an innovative unified framework is required to define 
and guide Mission-Critical Systems development so as to enhance 
mission success. 
4. IOA International Activities 
Today within a modern military platform, land, naval and air 
force, have adapted the principles of the Interoperable Open 
Architecture (IOA) in their system design to speed up acquisition 
and upgrading alongside with reducing life-cycle costs through 
data modelling. Below a selection of significant activities in the 
area of architectures and standardisation with IOA is presented. 
4.1. Generic Vehicle Architecture (GVA) 
The Generic Vehicle Architecture is an approach taken by the 
UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) to the design of electronic and 
power architectures for military vehicles. The approach is based on 
establishing system engineering principles to define a generic 
architecture that requires open implementation standards, Def-Stan 
23-009, to support cost-effective integration of sub-systems on 
land platforms, electronically, electrically and physically. Any 
equipment shall be integrated with the GVA military land 
platforms must be designed in the Land Data Model (LDM) which 
is a (sub)-system standardisation process [4]. 
4.2. NATO Generic Vehicle Architecture (NGVA) 
The NGVA is an approach to ensure interoperability among 
military land vehicles equipment. The NGVA follows a similar 
line to the GVA, incorporating a new method of verification and 
validation and by maturing the NGVA Data Model concepts, focus 
and implementation can be achieved [5], [6]. 
4.3. Future Airborne Capability Environment (FACE) 
The FACE approach is an aviation US government-industry 
software standard and business strategy for acquisition of 
affordable software systems that promotes innovation and rapid 
integration of portable capabilities across global defence 
programs. The main objective of this approach is to make military 
operations more robust, interoperable and secure using open 
standards [7].  
4.4. Vehicle Integration for C4ISR/EW Interoperability 
(VICTORY) 
VICTORY is a US army vehicle’s open standard for physical 
and logical interfaces between systems and C4ISR/EW 
components. The VICTORY architecture targets to provide a clear 
picture between to the users and the developers. Throughout the 
usage of an open architecture, the platforms can accept upgrades 
without a significant impact on the design. 
5. Generic Architecture Approach 
Model Driven Architecture (MDA) is an approach that is used 
in the system engineering domain to improve product development 
and delivery. The approach was initially launched in 2001 by the 
Object Management Group (OMG) to support the model-driven 
engineering of software systems. The main objective of the MDA 
is to provide a set of specifications of system’s functionality and 
behaviour expressed in models. Instead of writing the code 
manually, the MDA approach with the help of a data modelling 
tool it is possible to regenerate automatically an application code. 
Additionally, this approach reduces implementation and 
integration risks when an activity is designed.  
 In Figure 1 an illustration of the MDA process is presented. 
Initially, the system requirements can be defined and specified into 
a Platform Independent Model (PIM) model. Using a specific 
standard and specification, the model can be constructed in a 
formal way such as the Unified Modelling Language (UML). The 
objective of the PIM model is to specify data, operations, functions 
and modes of a system, independent of the platform in which it 
may be integrated. In order to organise and standardise the data as 
well as facilitate a long-term improvement in interoperability and 
upgradability within the model, a data model is essential. A 
Platform Specific Model (PSM) model contains elements of a 
specific software platform. It can be generated from the PIM model 
either manually or automatically if appropriate tools are used. The 
PSM embeds the chosen software architecture strategies which 
refine the PIM model based on specifications. The Platform 
Specific Implementation (PSI) embeds the chosen middleware 
technology and explains the usage of a specific platform.  
 
Figure 1. Model Driven Architecture Approach. 
Each electronic device is developed to satisfy one or more 
specific task(s) thus, the devices can only generate or receive a set 
of specific data for their operation. Therefore, when these devices 
are integrated into an IOA architecture, the broadcasted data 
cannot be ensured if is critical or not. For instance, the real-time 
level cannot be defined just by the device itself but is needed to be 
declared from the designers. Below there is a brief explanation of 
the real-time levels.   
Real-Time Level – In any electronic architecture there is a set 
of data or information it might be critical or noncritical. Real-time 
can enable non, soft and hard responsiveness depending on what 
level, prioritisation, and importance the data is designed for. In 
Vetronics different real-time levels are applied for satisfying 
different level processes or events. The definitions of real-time 
levels are:  
• Non-Real-Time (NRT) - Best Effort Service with no time 
constraints. 
Platform 
Specific
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The PSM specifies software architecture strategies such as:
Publish/Subscribe
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• Soft Real-Time (SRT) - Relaxed time (latency) 
requirements. 
• Hard Real-Time (HRT) - Fixed time requirements. [8] 
Due to the different critical level of data in Vetronics, this paper 
proposes a novel framework to support the developers to design 
and decide whether the data is critical or noncritical. With the aid 
of a flowchart, Figure 2 demonstrates a modular framework that is 
aimed to accurately design a data for a mission-critical system. The 
designer must firstly define the data attribute and if is already 
existing on the model. When the data attribute is declared, the 
designer must decide in what level of real-time responsiveness the 
data is belonging to. The different levels the data can take are the 
Hard, Soft, and Non-Real-Time. This can be useful for the 
developers to choose the appropriate network communication 
technology. Next, the designer must declare the criticality level of 
the data by choosing between Mission, Safety, and Security 
Critical levels. The critical levels shown in the diagram are the 
most commonly used levels used in the Vetronics systems. The 
user has the freedom to add/remove other critical levels such as 
survivability or business critical.  
 
Figure 2. Mission-Critical Modelling Framework. 
The next step is an assessment that is applied for the mission 
planning and goals based on risk assessments, a detailed 
explanation will be discussed in Sections 10 and 11. If the data fails 
the assessment is considered as non-mission-critical and if the data 
meets the requirements then is considered as mission-critical. In 
the mission-critical block, the data will be labelled with the 
Mission-Critical Integrity Level (MCIL). To ensure that the model 
is not polluted with data having similar attributes, a data 
commonality assessment is provided for addressing that issue. 
Finally, the data must have its own data type and must be checked 
whether the data type can be supported or not by the targeted 
programming language.  
In a communication network, there are multiple connection 
points that are able to receive, store and send data across. These 
connection points are known as network nodes. Figure 3 depicts a 
generic network node which is divided into three elements, 
communication, processing, and application. The application 
element, is a computer program designed to perform a group of 
coordinated functions, tasks or activities for the benefit of the end 
user. The processing in a networked node, is a combination of 
machines, people, and processes that for a set of inputs produces a 
defined set of outputs. And the communication is the 
communication endpoint. The transmission of data from one 
computer to another is achieved by the communication device 
using various communication technologies [9].  
 
Figure 3. Network Node. 
In the military vehicles, multiple (sub)-systems are integrated 
on a single platform. In a mission-critical system the most 
commonly used network nodes are sensors, actuators, effectors, 
processing nodes and so on. All the network nodes are interacting 
together through a virtual networking, as shown in Figure 4. A 
virtual network is capable of controlling one or more nodes over a 
logical or virtual networks that are decoupled from the underlying 
network hardware. This is used to ensure that the network nodes 
can efficiently integrate and perform on a single network. 
Common data sharing technologies used for military applications 
are the Data Distribution Service (DDS) and the Message Queuing 
Telemetry Transport (MQTT).  The gateway block is integrated to 
support system legacy and allow different existing on-board 
systems to provide and receive services.  
6. The need of Safety and Security 
In land military platforms, there are other existing critical 
systems. These critical systems are for the safety and for the 
security of the platform and the crew. Safety critical systems are 
the systems whose failure may endanger human life, economics or 
the environment. Examples of safety critical systems in military 
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vehicles are the vehicle’s steering and fire control. Security critical 
systems deal with the integrity and loss of sensitive data through 
theft or accidental loss [10]. 
 
Figure 4. Virtual Network. 
Safety and security critical systems can be used to extract 
logical capabilities, in which they can be mapped and used as the 
essentials of a successful mission-critical system. Considering 
safety and security capabilities on the development of a mission-
critical system, it is possible to achieve a complete integrated 
survivability system [11]. It is vital to increase the dimensions and 
properties of safety and security in a mission-critical system to 
address issues such as intrusion detection, component fault/failure 
detection system behaviour, and restoring essential services in case 
of a security attack [12].  
The developer must specify and approve the criticality level of 
each data. This can be varied depending on the application and 
technical specification related to user and system requirements. 
Although it is possible to declare and assess the data’s mission-
critical level using the Tables 1-4. The tables are essential to 
achieving a successful mission-critical system in which the 
mission goals are based on risk assessments. Risk assessments 
should be set and then that, the rigour of management and 
processes should be appropriate to meeting them.  
Assume a civilian vehicle used for a military application; when 
the vehicle’s passenger opens the vehicle’s door some interior 
lights are switched on. The interior lights are designed to provide 
luminosity in the vehicle at night or in dark environments. During 
the day or at bright environments the light does not significantly 
impact any process thus the related data for the light can be 
categorised as negligible or MCIL4. During the night the light may 
provide luminosity to the passengers but it also indicates the 
vehicle’s location. If the vehicle is used for a mission during night, 
it is likely the mission will fail, thus the corresponding data, for the 
light, can be categorised to as catastrophic or MCIL1. However, 
any data must be filtered and tested through the risk assessments 
before is integrated into the platform. Furthermore, the framework 
requires, that hazard and risk assessments be executed for the 
analysis of the likelihood of occurrence, consequences and 
detection levels provided by the tables below.  
Table 1 Categories of likelihood of failure occurrence 
Category Definition 
Range 
(Mission Failure) 
Frequent 
Many times in 
missions 
> 10-3 
Probable 
Several time in 
missions 
10-3 to 10-4 
Occasional Once in mission 10-4 to 10-5 
Remote 
Unlikely in 
missions 
10-5 to 10-6 
Improbable Very Unlikely 10-6 to 10-7 
Incredible 
Cannot believe 
that it could occur 
< 10-7 
 
Table 2 Consequence categories 
Category Definition 
Catastrophic Complete mission failure 
Critical Impacts mission but not complete failure 
Marginal Major mission issues 
Negligible Minor mission issues 
Table 3 Risk class matrix 
Likelihood 
Consequence 
Catastrophic Critical  Marginal Negligible 
Frequent Class 1 1 1 2 
Probable 1 1 2 3 
Occasional 1 2 3 3 
Remote 2 3 3 4 
Improbable 3 3 4 4 
Incredible 4 4 4 Class 4 
The classification of the consequences are as follow: 
• Class 1: Unacceptable in any circumstance 
• Class 2: Undesirable: tolerable only if risk reduction is 
impracticable or if the costs are grossly disproportionate to the 
improvement gained.  
• Class 3: Tolerable if the cost of risk reduction would exceed 
the improvement. 
•  Class 4: Acceptable as it stands, though it may need to be 
monitored. 
Once the hazard and risk assessments are identified, each of the 
threats should also be assigned with a detection level, as given in 
Table 4, in order to provide a definition in which degree a threat 
can be detected.   
Virtual Network (DDS/MQTT)
Sensors (n)
Processing 
Capability
Actuators (n) Effectors (n)
Gateway
On-Board 
(Sub)Systems
Data 
Collector
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Table 4 Detection Levels 
Difficulty Level Definition 
No effort Very likely to be detected 
Very Easy With almost no effort 
Easy Without great effort 
Normal Conforming to a standard 
Hard With a great deal or effort 
Very Hard Not likely to be detected 
Mission-critical levels, see Table 5, offers the ability to attain 
in regards to mission-critical system development and related to 
the Classification Matrix given in Table 3. Throughout risk 
assessments the target MCIL can be identified and thus, it can be 
converted as a requirement for the mission-critical system. The 
derived requirements can provide an efficient data model 
development that can be used and ensure that the mission-critical 
system can succeed a mission.  
Table 5 Mission-Critical Levels 
Mission-Critical 
Integrity Level 
Mission Failure 
Factor 
Risk 
Classification 
MCIL 4 100,000 to 10,000 Class 4 
MCIL 3 10,000 to 1,000 Class 3 
MCIL 2 1,000 to 100 Class 2 
MCIL 1 100 to 10 Class 1 
Safety (mission) critical applications, such as in [13] and [14], 
are using safety standards, such as the IEC 61508 and the RTCA 
DO-178B, in which are oriented for people’s safety when a system 
is designed. The standards are intended to be a basic functional 
safety standard applicable to cover the safety management of 
electrical, electronic and programmable electronic systems 
throughout their lives. If the development of a mission-critical 
system involves human factors then the system should be 
considered as a safety critical system. 
7. Threat Estimation 
First, it is important to note that Tables 1, 2 and 4 are 
abbreviated as, Occurrence – O[n], Severity – SE[n], Detection – 
D[n] and threat estimation as T[n], with “[n]” representing a 
natural number [1] of each element or requirement. For example, 
if one threat is identified within the framework, then the threat will 
be assigned to as T[1]. If threat T[1] has sub-requirements, then it 
will be assigned to as T[1][n].  
In order to evaluate or estimate the criticality of the identified 
threat T[n], the aforementioned tables and their elements must be 
assigned with numerical values, as depicted in Table 6. The idea 
behind the values is indicative (assumption), therefore, the 
maximum value of the threat T[n] can be roughly 99.9% and the 
lowest 0%. These values will indicate the probability of the threat 
affecting the mission. 
Therefore, the threat level of the identified threat T[n], 
TL_T[n] can be calculated using the following expression, 
 
𝑇𝐿_𝑇[𝑛] = 𝑂[𝑛] + 𝑆𝐸[𝑛] + 𝐷[𝑛] (1) 
  
Where, 
TL_T[n]: The threat level of the identified threat. 
O[n]: The occurrence value of the O[n]. 
SE[n]: The severity value of the SE[n]. 
D[n]: The detection value of the D[n]. 
 
In the event of having multiple threats or sub-threats, an 
estimation of an overall threat must be calculated in order to 
predict the probability of the mission success. A representation of 
this is shown in Table 7.  
Where, 
Req_core: The core requirement. 
1st Sub: The first sub_core_requirement. 
n Sub: Indicated the last sub-requirement. 
n: Represents the real number. 
i: Represents the sequential number of sub-requirements. 
An approach on how to calculate the average value of two or 
more requirements of the same degree is as follows, (2), 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 The Assigned Values for Calculating Threat T[n] 
Occurrence – O[n] Occurrence (%) Severity – SE[n] Severity (%) Detection – D[n] Detection (%) 
Frequent 25 Catastrophic ≤50 Very Hard 25 
Probable 20 Critical ~33.4[3.s.f] Hard 20 
Occasional 15 Marginal ~16.7[3.s.f] Normal 15 
Remote 10 Negligible 0 Easy 10 
Improbable 5 
  
Very Easy 5 
Incredible 0 
  
No Effort 0 
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Table 7 Requirement Sequence 
Req 1st Sub n Sub 
 Req[1][1] Req[1]…i…[1] 
Req[1] … … 
 Req[1][n] Req[1]…i…[n] 
 … … 
 Req[n][1] Req[n]…i…[1] 
Req[n] … … 
 Req[n][n] Req[n]…i…[n] 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑞_𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 =∑
𝑅𝑒𝑞[𝑖]
𝑛
𝑛
𝑖=1
 (2) 
Where: 
Req_core: The overall average value of the core requirement. 
i: Lower limit number of requirement. 
n: Upper limit number of requirement.  
8. Case Study: Defensive Aid Suite (DAS) System 
A most commonly used mission-critical system in the military 
platforms, is the Defensive Aid Suite (DAS) system. Is a 
survivability system, and can be used as a potential case study that 
addresses similar complexity issues to the aforementioned 
mission-critical systems and integration levels. A DAS is 
composed of sensors, effectors, algorithms and Human Machine 
Interfaces (HMI) that enhances the integrated survivability of a 
military vehicle. DAS also consists of different decoupling 
physical and logical capability networks applied for specific tasks 
or applications.  
The DAS system can be a semi-autonomous or autonomous 
system that is capable of detecting, recognising and addressing 
threats. DAS elements are classified into two major categories 
Soft-Kill and Hard-Kill; other action categories are also possible 
where effective countermeasures can be deployed by other assets. 
A Hard-Kill system engages and destroys threats. It creates an 
active fire zone of protection at a safe distance near the vehicle. 
A Soft-Kill system is designed to avoid threats by confusing or 
re-directing the threats using jammers, decoys, and signature 
reduction measures. 
An existing soft-kill DAS system from [14] has been selected 
for this case study, using existing DAS system components. In this 
DAS system various electronic components can be addressed, 
which are used in a Light Armed Vehicle (LAV) vehicle. A 
component such as the Long Range Passive Sensing (LRPS) 
sensor. The threat can be detected using optical systems with either 
Wide Field Of View (WFOV) or Narrowed Field Of View 
(NFOV) mounted on the platform. Each of the detected threats 
produces a signature identifying a potential threat that may be 
weapon systems such as guns and anti-tank rocket-propelled 
grenade launchers (i.e. M-712 and RPG-7). The detection range of 
the WFOV and NFOV optics are represented in Table 8. The table 
can be used as a message specification for a generic DAS system. 
Table 8 Sensor Camera and Threats Attributes [15]  
Anti-Armour 
Threats 
Threat, 
Calibre 
M-712, 
LSAH, 
155mm 
RPG-7, 
80mm 
Gun, 
20mm, 
APDS 
IR WFOV 
Distance, 
[m] 
400 470 5480 
IR NFOV 
Distance, 
[m] 
3600 4200 340 
LI/RG 
Camera 
Threat, 
[Pixels] 
1.3 42 x 42 0.8 
Target, 
[Pixels] 
25x20 
234 x 
187 
118 x 60 
Threat 
 
Variables 
Dimensions, 
[m] 
0.155 dia. 0.18 dia. 2.1 dia. 
Range, [m] 14000 500 2000 
Velocity, 
[m/s] 
255 255 815 
9. Proposed DAS Architecture and Modules 
This section presents a novel DAS system architecture that 
could be potentially used to satisfy the questions in Section II as 
presented earlier in this paper. For the system to facilitate a 
modular framework the Model Driven Architecture approach is 
used to construct modules that enable upgradability, 
maintainability and system legacy with technologies, devices and 
operational or functional capabilities. This proposed DAS 
architecture aims to fuse systems and software modelling and 
simulation capabilities, modular open system architectures and 
device integration techniques into a single package to enable rapid 
design, development, verification, certification and deployment of 
interoperable, platform portable and manoeuvre embedded 
mission criticality. The following sub-sections are classified as 
module models used for a DAS system and can also be applied for 
any mission-critical system. 
9.1. Threats 
Threats are all the known causes that can damage the platforms. 
Threats can be either external or internal; internal threats could be 
cyber-attacks, malfunction etc. External threats could be missiles 
or mines. 
9.2. Sensors 
Sensors module represents all the candidate sensors used for 
the DAS system. This module is for detecting and responding to 
any incoming threat from the physical environment. The specific 
input may be motion, heat, light or any of other environmental 
phenomena. The output is a signal that is converted into a format 
that is human readable or machine readable electronically 
transmitted over a network for exploitation and further processing. 
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The Sensors module can be directly connected to the DAS Sensor 
Processing Module to apply the safety, security, and performance 
on the indented design. 
9.3. DAS Sensor Processing Module (DASSPM) 
The DASSPM is the module that is capable of receiving the 
data/information from the DAS sensor. The DASSPM converts the 
data into a usable format that can classify, position and eventually 
eliminate or avoid the detected threat. The module will be able to 
detect also the attributes of the candidate DAS sensor in terms of 
type and capability if the appropriate message specification is 
constructed. 
The DASSPM, therefore, receives the data/information from 
the candidate sensor and extra qualities can be added. Developers 
can customise the data and modify it into the corresponding real-
time environment, criticality level, and mission-critical integrity 
level. The DASSPM will also communicate with the DASECM. 
9.4. DAS Computer Module (DASCM) 
The DASCM collects and processes the information from the 
DASSPM, to decide the best action for each available threat. This 
action may require user interaction or it can be fully automated. 
The modular design allows the system designer to use a single or 
multiple DASC that may deal with the same or different types of 
threats at the same time, providing fault tolerant and distributed 
design. Then the DASC communicated with the appropriate DAS 
Effector Control Module (DASECM), depending on the type of 
action decided. When there is no DASC available, the DASECM 
takes responsibility for the appropriate countermeasure action. 
9.5. DAS Effector Control Module (DASECM) 
The DASECM is responsible for controlling the DAS effectors 
according to the commands received from the DASCM. This 
module has many commonalities in data and functionality with the 
DASSPM. In the case of DASC failure, the DASECM can be 
actioned to directly deal with the threat. Additionally, it offers 
configuration options for the effector to achieve modularity and 
dynamic configuration. 
9.6. Effectors 
The Effectors Module is the representation of the all the 
candidate effectors. This module is constructed upon the available 
effectors needed to be installed on the platform. Each of the 
candidate effectors carries specific attribute thus, the module is 
using message specifications common to the overall architecture.   
10. Top Level of a DAS Data Model 
Due to the increased number of electronic components 
designed from different manufacturers who use different 
technologies, approaches, standards and architectures, the systems 
integration process becomes rather complex. A suggested 
approach to improve the vehicle’s performance and survivability 
is to use, information management techniques. In this paper, the 
potential approach to such component’s capability acquisition is 
proposed by structuring a set of message specifications and 
develop the DAS Data Model, represented in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. Top Level of DAS Architecture. 
Following the proposed framework and the proposed DAS 
architecture and modules, the system will be able to use different 
battlefield scenarios, operational modes and different electronic 
devices from different manufacturers. With this development and 
the combination of the proposed approaches, the DAS Data Model 
will provide the different criticality levels and the different real-
time environments that will be the essentials for a successful 
mission. 
10.1. DAS PIM 
Using the IBM Rational Rhapsody Developer for C++ tool, the 
message specification for the soft-kill DAS system sensors is 
represented in a UML model as shown in Figure 6. The tool is 
selected because it is the most commonly used for land vehicle 
electronic architectures, specifically in the GVA approach 
implementation [4]. This a PIM in which it has the ability to be 
redesigned when additional modifications are required during the 
development, or additional sensors are included in the DAS 
system.  This PIM model is constructed using the attributes in 
Table 8 and with the usage of the proposed MCIL framework and 
DAS architecture, the mission-critical message specifications of a 
soft kill DAS can be created. 
 
Figure 6. Threat PIM. 
The message specification in Figure 6 has its own Mission-
Critical Integrity Level (MCIL_n) and Real-Time (RTL) levels. 
DASSPM DASECMDASCM
Network
Sensors EffectorsThreats
MCIL_n
MCIL1:Class1
MCIL2:Class2
MCIL3:Class3
MCIL4:Class4
RTL
HRT:Hard_Real_Time
NRT:Non_Real_Time
SRT:Soft_Real_Time
Threats
MCIL:MCIL_n
Real_Time:RTL
Threat_Type:GUN_APDS
1
*
1
*
GUN_APDS
Calibre:mm
Dimension:m
Range:m
Velocity:m/s
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The developer will have the freedom to choose between the 
aforementioned levels when applying the paper’s approaches. For 
instance, if the vehicle uses passive armour the specific threat is 
not lethal, therefore, the Mission-Critical Integrity level of the 
message can be classified as Class 4.  If is a light armoured vehicle 
then the Mission Criticality Integrity level can be classified as 
Class 2. The same can be applied for the Real-Time 
responsiveness. 
10.2. DAS PSM  
Once the PIM model is designed and specified, the model can 
be translated into PSM for integration into a specific architecture. 
The middleware technologies that can be used are the Data 
Distribution Service (DDS) or Message Queue Telemetry 
Transport (MQTT). DDS is an OMG machine-to-machine 
middleware standard that offers scalability, real-time, Quality of 
Service (QoS), high performance and interoperability data 
exchange between data publishers and subscribers. 
Publish/Subscribe message patterns are used for sharing the DAS 
system data in order to minimise the impact of adding new sub-
systems [16].   MQTT is a lightweight messaging protocol that 
offers bi-directional communication to nodes. Its design has been 
created to minimise network bandwidth that uses the messages in 
a reliable degree of delivery.   
When each attribute in the PSM model has its own data type, 
it must be specified and validated from the supported primitive 
data types of each target environment of DDS. The message 
specification file is used to describe the software component’s 
application in order to enable communication between software 
components from different programming languages. However, the 
PSM transformation can be translated into a PSI model for the 
simulations and apply case studies of any mission-critical 
environments. 
11. Qualitative and Quantitative Results 
Using the example in Figure 6 (Section 10.1) and applying 
the threat estimation procedure discussed in Section 7, the threat 
can be calculated and then estimate the effect level of the mission. 
The example stated the following, “if the vehicle uses passive 
armour the specific threat (see Figure 6) is not lethal, therefore, the 
Mission-Critical Integrity level of the message can be classified as 
Class 4.  For a light armoured vehicle then the Mission Criticality 
Integrity level can be classified as Class 2”. In this section an 
estimation of the effect level of the stated threat is presented using 
anticipated values for each element. 
11.1. Case 1: Passive Armour Vehicle 
Case 1: If the vehicle uses passive armour then threat is as 
depicted in Figure 7. 
The occurrence O[1] of the potential cause can be occasional. 
Therefore, the occurrence selected from Tables 1 and 6 is, 
Occurrence: O[1] – Occasional (15%) 
Using Table 6, the O[1] is 15%. 
Considering that the threat does not significantly impact the 
mission or the vehicle, the severity of the specified threat can be 
negligible. Using Tables 2 and 6,  
Severity: SE[1] – Negligible (0%) 
Assuming that the vehicle uses passive armour instead of 
active, the threat T[1] will be detected from the crew. Therefore, 
the detection might be considered to as hard to detect, and using 
Tables 4 and 6, 
Detection: D[1] – Hard (20%) 
 
Figure 7 Case 1: T[n] Level 
 
TL_T[1]: [(O[1]:15%)+(SE[1]:0%)+(D[1]:20%)= 35% 
After the threat analysis of the specific threat for this case 
study, it has been identified to be 35% hazardous against the 
mission. 
11.2. Case 2: Light Armoured Vehicle 
Case 2: If the vehicle is a light armoured vehicle then the threat 
will be as in Figure 8. The occurrence O[1] of the potential cause 
can be occasional similar to the Case 1. Therefore, the occurrence 
selected from Tables 1 and 6 is, 
Occurrence: O[1] – Occasional (15%) 
Using Table 6, the O[1] is 15%. 
Considering that the threat significantly impacts the mission or 
the vehicle then the severity of the specified threat can be 
catastrophic. Using the table 2 and 6,  
Severity: SE[1] – Negligible (50%) 
As aforementioned, the vehicle is a light armoured vehicle and 
assume that it has an integrated DAS system. Therefore, the threat 
T[1] to be detected can be categorised as easy. Using the Tables 4 
and 6, detection is, 
Detection: D[1] – Easy (10%) 
 
Figure 8 Case 2: T[n] Level 
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TL_T[1]: [(O[1]:15%)+(SE[1]:50%)+(D[1]:10%)= 75%. 
The same threat as identified in Case 1 has being calculated to 
be 75% within this case study (2); whilst the same threat for a 
different mission scenario has increased in terms of threatening 
level. This in turn, elements that can be identified for a mission 
shall be re-used and analysed accordingly using this preliminary 
mission analysis at this early stage of a mission-critical system. 
12. Conclusion and Future Work 
At present there are no current development activities 
employed for mission-critical systems. In this paper, the 
importance of those activities is discussed. The objective of the 
proposed framework, is to enable system engineers achieve the 
mission development of any critical system's life-cycle, efficiently 
and effectively. This is achieved through a single package, using 
the three following main capabilities.  
Firstly, a basic functional “mission standard” that enables the 
mission life-cycle development in a critical system; Secondly, the 
ability of mission interoperability for services and functionalities 
between systems and sub-systems built and procured in different 
times; and finally, the process that can support to define and 
analyse the mission data requirements of various critical systems.  
The paper covered only the primary mission-critical attributes 
of a critical system, extracting the basic functional requirements. 
The scope of those requirements is paying particular attention on 
the mission, safety and security-critical attributes.  
Furthermore, the extended part of this work, proposed an 
approach to estimate threats and their impact on a mission  so as to 
early de-risk missions and systems (mission-critical) whilst in their 
design stages. 
The next step is to further develop and refine the proposed 
using detail low level design case studies along with measures of 
performance.  
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